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Windmill: Resource-scoped API tokens can read script contents outside their allowed path via scripts/list_search

Moderate severity GitHub Reviewed Published Jun 3, 2026 in windmill-labs/windmill • Updated Jul 10, 2026

Package

cargo windmill-api (Rust)

Affected versions

<= 1.714.1

Patched versions

1.715.0

Description

Summary

A resource-scoped API token can read script contents outside its allowed path scope via GET /api/w/{workspace}/scripts/list_search.

This appears to be a remaining variant of the scoped-token authorization class previously addressed for other endpoints. The route-level scope middleware validates the token domain/action, but does not enforce the resource/path segment of a scope. scripts/list_search then returns script path and content for scripts in the workspace without applying per-row path filtering against the token scopes.

Affected endpoint

GET /api/w/{workspace}/scripts/list_search

Affected versions

Confirmed in the current public repository code and believed to affect the latest published release at the time of review:

<= 1.714.1

Patched version: unknown.

Details

Windmill supports scoped API tokens with scopes in the format:

{domain}:{action}[:{resource}]

The parser supports resource-scoped values such as:

scripts:read:f/allowed/*

and the codebase contains helpers for resource matching, including wildcard matching.

However, the route-level scope check used for requests with scoped API tokens only validates the route domain and action. It does not compare the token's resource/path restriction against the requested route or against the rows returned by list endpoints.

For scripts/list_search, the handler returns path and content for scripts in the workspace:

SELECT path, content from script WHERE workspace_id = $1 AND archived = false LIMIT $2

There is no additional check_scopes(...) call in the handler and no per-row filtering based on the token's resource/path scope.

As a result, a token intended to read only scripts under one path prefix may be able to read script contents from unrelated paths in the same workspace.

Source-level reproduction

  1. Create or use a workspace containing at least two scripts:
  • f/allowed/script_a
  • f/private/script_b
  1. Create a scoped API token intended to read only the allowed path:

scripts:read:f/allowed/*

  1. Use that token to call:

GET /api/w/{workspace}/scripts/list_search

  1. Expected behavior:

The response should include only scripts matching the token's resource scope, e.g. only scripts under:

f/allowed/*

  1. Actual behavior from source review:

The route-level scope check accepts the request as scripts:read, and the handler returns script path and content for scripts in the workspace without filtering the rows by the token's resource scope.

This can expose script source code from paths outside the token's intended scope.

Impact

A user or integration holding a path-restricted scripts:read:{resource} token may be able to read script contents from unrelated scripts in the same workspace.

Depending on how scripts are used, this may disclose:

  • internal automation logic,
  • integration details,
  • business logic,
  • inline configuration,
  • accidentally hardcoded secrets or credentials.

This does not require admin privileges. It requires possession of a valid scoped API token for the workspace.

Related context

This appears related to the broader class of issues where route-level token scope enforcement validates domain/action but not the resource/path portion of the scope. Similar scoped-token issues appear to have been fixed for other endpoints, such as resources/variables listing and job preview/run paths, but I did not find an equivalent fix for scripts/list_search.

Suggested fix

Apply resource/path scope enforcement to scripts/list_search.

Possible approaches:

  1. Add explicit handler-level authorization similar to per-resource endpoints.
  2. Filter returned rows so that a scoped token only receives scripts whose path is included by at least one scripts:read:{resource} scope.
  3. Add regression tests for:
    • scripts:read:f/allowed/* cannot see f/private/script_b,
    • broad scripts:read still sees all accessible scripts,
    • unscoped tokens preserve current behavior,
    • filter-tag-only tokens preserve current compatibility behavior.

A more defensive long-term fix would be to make route-level scope enforcement aware of resource/path restrictions where the route contains a concrete resource path, while list endpoints should apply per-row filtering.

References

@rubenfiszel rubenfiszel published to windmill-labs/windmill Jun 3, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Jul 10, 2026
Reviewed Jul 10, 2026
Last updated Jul 10, 2026

Severity

Moderate

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Network
Attack Complexity Low
Attack Requirements None
Privileges Required High
User interaction None
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality Low
Integrity None
Availability None
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability None

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(7th percentile)

Weaknesses

Incorrect Authorization

The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-54136

GHSA ID

GHSA-2ppx-66jv-wpw5

Source code

Credits

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